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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM FROM
ACCIDENTAL SHOOTINGS BY POLICE IS NOT A
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED RIGHT FOR THE
PURPOSES OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITYCORBITT V. VICKERS, 929 F.3D 1304
(11TH CIR. 2019).
The Fourth Amendment controls "a free citizen's claim that law
enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of ... [a] 'seizure'
of his person." 1 As the law stands today, an action by law enforcement must
be intentionally - rather than accidentally - directed towards the plaintiff for
a court to find that the action violated the plaintiff's constitutional right to be
free from excessive force.2 In Corbittv. Vickers,3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined whether a gunshot, intended for
a family dog that accidentally hit and injured a ten-year-old boy who was
lawfully seized by police, violated the child's Fourth Amendment right to be
free from excessive force. 4 The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court
erred by denying the officer's motion to dismiss based on a qualified
immunity defense because the plaintiff could not offer evidence to support
any of the three means by which a plaintiff may overcome such a defense.5
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (discussing requirement of specific
constitutional infringement to overcome qualified immunity in excessive force cases).
2 See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (reasoning that law enforcement
action cannot be simultaneously unknowing and violative of constitutional rights). "Violation of
the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control." Id.
' 929 F.3d 1304 (1lth Cir. 2019).
4 See id. at 1313-14 (reviewing whether bystanders have established Fourth Amendment right
to be free from accidental police shootings). The court, quoting Terry v. Ohio, stated "[i]t must be
recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has 'seized' that person." Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)). This also
applies with equal force to cases involving innocent bystanders. Corbitt,929 F.3d at 1313-14.
5 See Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1312 (characterizing three ways plaintiffs may overcome qualified
immunity in excessive force cases). A plaintiff must "show that a materially similar case has
already been decided," that a "broader, clearly established principle should control the novel facts"
of a certain situation, or that the case "fits within the exception of conduct which so obviously
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On July 10, 2014, Deputy Sheriff Michael Vickers ("Vickers") and
several other Coffee County Sheriff s Officers in Georgia were tasked with
apprehending a criminal suspect who had wandered into Amy Corbitt's
("Corbitt") property.6 Corbitt's ten-year-old child ("SDC"), along with five
other minor children and one adult, were all in the yard when the7officers
entered and demanded that all seven individuals lay on the ground. While
the children were lying on the ground and obeying the officers' 8 orders,
Officer Vickers discharged his firearm at the family dog twice. After
Vickers's first shot missed, the dog retreated under the home before
reappearing to approach its owners.'
As the dog approached after the first shot was fired, Vickers
right
discharged his firearm again, missed the dog, struck the back of SDC's
0 The
knee-who was lying only eighteen inches away from the officer.'
suspect, who the officers originally entered the property to detain, was
visibly unarmed and readily compliant during the entire seizure." Doctors
performed medical imaging to confirm a serious gunshot wound to SDC's
12
right knee, resulting in chronic and severe pain and mental trauma. SDC's
3
injuries required ongoing care from an orthopedic surgeon.
Corbitt brought a civil action against Officer Vickers, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the officer violated SDC's Fourth Amendment
4
constitutional right to be free from excessive force.1 The district court
violates [the] constitution that prior case law is unnecessary." Id. (quoting Mercado v. City of
Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11 th Cir. 2005)).
6 See Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1308 (discussing reasons police entered property). There was no
indication as to the nature of the crime the suspect was being apprehended for, but the complaint
noted that the suspect appeared to be compliant and unarmed. Id.
7 See id. (describing relationship between bystanders and suspect). Since SDC was a minor
child, the suit was filed by his mother, Amy Corbitt, on behalf of SDC. Id. His name remains
confidential due to his status as a minor. Id.
8 See id. (describing officer's actions when dog appeared). The children complied with the
officers' orders at all times, and it is alleged that the discharge of the firearm occurred without
necessity or immediate cause. Id.
9 See id. (discussing officer's decision to shoot dog twice). No efforts were made to restrain
the dog and the dog did not appear to be threatening toward either the children or officers. Id.
the
10 See id. (describing scene prior to officer shooting child). Just before the second shot,
Id.
officers.
the
with
compliant
child was readily viewable and remained
11 See id. (discussing allegation of unreasonable police conduct).
12 See Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11 th Cir. 2019) (discussing physical and
psychological effects of officer's actions).
13 See id. (noting long-term effects of injuries).
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2019) (stating current law for civil actions for deprivation of
constitutional rights).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
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denied Vickers's motion to dismiss based on the qualified immunity defense
because it was determined that he used excessive force in firing his weapon.15
Officer Vickers appealed the denial of his motion to the Eleventh Circuit,
which subsequently remanded the case to the district court with instructions
to grant Vickers's motion to dismiss because there was no clearly established
6
right to be free from accidental applications of force.1
Qualified immunity first developed in 1967 as a defense of "good
faith and probable cause" when plaintiffs filed claims against arresting
officers using the Fourth Amendment. 7 By 1982, the Supreme Court moved
toward an objective formulation to determine whether the defense of
qualified immunity could shield a government official "accused of violating
the Constitution from having to pay money damages if the defendant's
conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable
official would have known."18 To overcome the defense of qualified

any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Id.; see also Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1308 (explaining civil action Corbitt brought against officer and
police force).
1" See Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1309 (finding officers not entitled to qualified immunity when they
use excessive force). The district court reasoned that, although the Vickers meant to shoot the
animal, his shot ultimately was intended to maintain control of the situation. Id. As such, SDC
was "seized" for 4th Amendment purposes. Id.
16
See id. at 1318 (finding such Fourth Amendment violations require officer's action be
intentional).
17 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967) (expanding defense of good faith and
probable cause to apply to actions under § 1983); see also Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of
Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 NEV. L.J. 185, 186 (2008) (outlining expansion of
"reasonable mistake" defense to almost all executive agents); George Leef, Qualified ImmunityA Rootless Doctrine the Court Should Jettison, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:53 AM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2018/03/21/qualified-immunity-a-rootless-doctrine-the-court-shouldjettison/#15a4227e31c7 [perma.cc/6MTW-XXB9] (noting qualified immunity defense was not
explicit in statute but "invented" by Supreme Court).
18 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,815 (1982) (holding "subjective element" of goodfaith defense incompatible with "good faith" immunity); see also Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified
Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 581, 619 (1998) (analyzing objective test
requiring "plaintiff to allege more than" malice to overcome qualified immunity defense); Lisa R.
Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The UnqualifiedParadoxes of Qualified Immunity: Reasonably Mistaken
Beliefs, Reasonably Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter of Subjective Intent that Haunts
Objective Legal Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 869, 869-70 (1998) (examining shift to
objective test). The shift was necessary to balance the redressability of civil abuses and protection
of government stability. Eskow & Cole, supra, at 869-70; see also Nick Sibilla, Cop Who
Accidentally Shot 10-Year-Old When Aiming for Family Dog Can't Be Sued, Federal CourtRules,
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immunity, a plaintiff must show that the government official violated a
9
constitutional right and that the right was "clearly established."'

Since the development of the objective formulation for qualified
immunity, federal courts have continually split over cases where a
government official used excessive or unreasonable force against an
individual."0 The Eleventh Circuit, specifically known for granting officials

qualified immunity even when there may have been no lawful basis, has
outlined three potential ways a plaintiff may overcome the defense of
qualified immunity, but characterizes each with an especially high burden on

the plaintiff.21 First, the plaintiff can show that a "materially similar case has

FORBES (July 18, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2019/O7/18/cop-whoaccidentally-shot- 10-year-old-when-aiming-for- family-dog-cant-be-sued-federal-court-rules/#gd
68d039877b [perma.cc/PJ93-732K] (discussing reshaping of doctrine in 1980s and its protection
of all officials except those "plainly incompetent").
19 See Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1199 (lth Cir. 2007) (discussing
applicability of qualified immunity when police act reasonably). "Qualified immunity shields
public officials from civil damages 'as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought
consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated."' Id. (internal citations omitted); see
also Armacost, supra note 18, at 619-20 (noting that right must be "clearly established" and
described with particularity in factually analogous cases); Karen M. Blum, Symposium, Qualified
Immunity: Time to Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1887, 1893-94 (2018)
(addressing court discretion to forgo tough constitutional questions when alternative analysis is
available).
20 See Eskow & Cole, supra note 18, at 871 (examining circuit variations in analysis of
excessive force law and availability of qualified immunity defense); see also Marcus R. Nemeth,
Note, How Was That Reasonable? The Misguided Development of Qualified Immunity and
Excessive Force by Law Enforcement Officers, 60 B.C.L. REV. 989, 1005 (2019) (analyzing that
courts continue to "build upon past precedents by increasing protections for police officers.").
21 See Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (11 th Cir. 2009) (discussing requirement that case
law be factually similar). "[I]f case law, in factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified
immunity almost always protects the defendant." Id.; see also Brown, supra note 17, at 197
(explaining between 1990 and 2002 "constitutional victims' chances of' overcoming qualified
immunity "closely approached zero"). The Eleventh Circuit has granted the defense of qualified
immunity to government officials in "just about every constitutional context imaginable." Brown,
supra note 17, at 197. Notably, following the Eleventh Circuit's granting of qualified immunity in
Hope v. Pelzer (240 F.3d 975, 977 (lth Cir. 2001)), the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
three more Eleventh Circuit opinions involving "egregious violations" that would have had
different results in other circuits. Brown, supra note 17, at 205; see also Eskow & Cole, supra note
18, at 906 (requiring but for showing once official introduces objectively reasonable explanation
for conduct); Emma Ockerman, It's Nearly Impossible to Sue a Copfor Shooting Someone. These
Democratic Candidates Are Trying to Change That, VICE (Oct. 31, 2019, 12:25 PM),
https://www.vice.com/en-us/artice/7x5jj9its-neary-impssibe-t-sue-a-cp-for-shoting-some
(noting
[perma.cc/W7HT-YQXE]
one-these-democratic-candidates-are-trying-to-change-that
plaintiffs must prove "a systemic problem or an official police department policy" caused
constitutional violation). The plaintiff must show the officer violated a "clearly established right"
that had been previously established in case law; however, because "so few of these cases make it
to court," that showing is nearly impossible. Ockerman, supra.
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already been decided. 22 Second, the plaintiff can show a "broader, clearly
established principle should control the novel facts" of the specific
situation .23 Finally, the plaintiff can show the particular case "fits within the
exception of conduct which so obviously violates [the] [C]onstitution that
24

prior case law is unnecessary.
When an innocent bystander is temporarily detained and
subsequently becomes the victim of unreasonable or excessive force by law
enforcement officials, it is difficult to overcome a qualified immunity
defense, even if he or she is considered "seized" under the Fourth
5
Amendment as "the force employed was not directed towards [him or] her.1

22

See Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (1 lth Cir. 2005) (requiring "materially

similar" case be decided before the officer's alleged violative conduct); see also White v. Pauly,
137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (recognizing "longstanding principle that clearly
established law 'should not be defined' with high level of generality."); Loftus v. Clark-Moore,
690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11 th Cir. 2012) (explaining analysis must tie particularized facts to judicial
precedents); David French, A Dreadful Police Shooting Highlights the Need to Change a Terrible
Law, NAT'L REVIEW (July 11, 2019, 3:57 PM) https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/adreadful-police-shooting-highlights-the-need-to-change-a-terrible-law/
[perma.cc/Z689-GEPK]
(discussing "extraordinarily restrictive" definition of "clearly established" rights leaves plaintiffs
with little hope of redress). The plaintiff's requirement of showing a clearly established right
through "remarkably similar case[s] with nearly identical facts" essentially gives officers in each
jurisdiction "one 'free' constitutional violation, and since there are virtually endless different ways
in which state officials can interact with citizens," these violations pile up. French, supra; see also
Jay Schweikert, Eleventh CircuitGrantsImmunity to Officer Who Shot ChildLying on the Ground,
CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (July 15, 2019, 10:48 AM) https://www.cato.org/blog/eleventhcircuit-grants-immunity-officer-who-shot-child-lying-ground-while-trying-shoot
[perma.cc/X7VJ
-CLJF] (realizing difficulty in finding similar case law involving "unique facts of this case").
Although overcoming qualified immunity does not require "the very action in question [to] ha[ve]
previously been held unlawful," the Eleventh Circuit seems to require "this level of specificity."
Schweikert, supra.
23 See Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1159 (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 743 (2002))
(noting "reasoning ... not the holding" of prior cases also places reasonable officers on notice of
clearly established right); see also Loftus, 690 F.3d at 1205 (holding clearly established principles
must exist "with obvious clarity by the case law."). The purpose of the obvious clarity rule is to
ensure that every "objectively reasonable government official" will have notice of the violative
conduct. Loftus, 690 F.3d at 1205.
24 See Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1159 (requiring plaintiff identify law "interpreted by the Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Supreme Court of Florida."); see also Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
1188, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002) (highlighting only way to overcome test). The plaintiff must show
that case law standards "inevitably lead every reasonable officer in [the defendant's] position to
conclude the force was unlawful." Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1199 (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
25 See Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 480 (4th Cir. 2006) (declining extension of protection
to innocent bystanders "unintentionally killed by police" while seizing fleeing criminal). Where a
victim is "not the intended object of the shooting by which he was injured," he cannot be "seized"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Rucker v. Harford County, 946 F.2d 278,
281 (4th Cir. 1991)); see alsoBrower v. County Of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593,596-97 (1989) (determining
Fourth Amendment protections do not cover accidental effects of otherwise lawful government
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The objective test outlined by the Supreme Court has left room for
interpretation, allowing circuit courts to refuse to recognize innocent
bystanders' Fourth Amendment claims by distinguishing between the
"police action directed toward producing a particular result-in Fourth
Amendment parlance, 'an intentional acquisition of physical control'-and
police action that simply causes a particular result." 6 The focus of a
qualified immunity defense and Fourth Amendment violation analysis is the
"misuse of power, not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government
conduct."z"
In Corbitt v. Vickers, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided
whether a police officer should be shielded from liability through the
doctrine of qualified immunity when the officer accidentally shot a lawfully

conduct); see also Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1155-57 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding
no seizure when officers accidentally shot plaintiff while intending instead to restrain plaintiff's
abductors).
26 See Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosine, 906 F.2d 791,795 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Brower, 489
U.S. at 596) (holding "intention" requirement of government action cannot be met by
"deliberateness with which a given action is taken."); see also Evan Bernick, It's Time to Limit
Qualified Immunity, GEO. LAW: GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (Sept. 17, 2018), available at
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/public-policy-journal/blog/its-time-to-limit-qualified-immunity/
[perma.cc/5GTN-FYCF] (explaining "over-deterrence and fairness concerns" no longer justify
modern-day use of defense of qualified immunity); Adam D. Franks, Note, ConstitutionalLawFourth Amendment and Seizures -Accidental Seizures by Deadly Force: Who Is Seized During a
Police Shootout? Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012 (2014), 38 U. ARK. LIrrLE ROCK L. REV.
493, 510 (2016) (noting split among circuits in application of Fourth Amendment violations for
innocent bystanders). Since the subjective good faith of officials has been deemed irrelevant in
determining whether qualified immunity applies, "it is doubtful that qualified immunity reliably
distinguishes between officials who are trying their best to abide by the law and those who are not."
Bernick, supra. The expansion and hardening of the doctrine of qualified immunity "contradicts
the original meaning of Section 1983 and undermines constitutional principles" by making it
incredibly difficult for victims of official misconduct to "vindicate their rights." Bernick, supra;
see also Leef, supra note 17 (noting irony that ordinary citizens "can't escape responsibility by
saying '[blut we did not know that was illegal."'); cf. Norman Miller, Court Rules Framingham
Officer Not Immune in Shooting Lawsuit, METROWEST DAILY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2016, 4:04 PM),
https://www.metrowestdailynews.com/news/20160205/court-rules-framingham-officer-notimmune-in-shooting-lawsuit [perma.cc/8MUT-N5NG] (discussing accidental shooting where
officer held loaded gun at suspect on ground and discharged weapon). Since the firing of the gun
was directed at the plaintiff and the law was "sufficiently clearly established" to place the officer
on notice that his actions toward an "innocent and compliant person" were unreasonable, qualified
immunity could not shield the officer from liability. Miller, supra.
27 See Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 (holding no Fourth Amendment seizure unless there is
"governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied."); see
also Franks, supra note 26, at 524 (noting victims' accidental shooting claims brought under Fourth
Amendment do not govern negligent police conduct); Sibilla, supra note 18 (analyzing that if
plaintiff was not "arrested, investigated, or intentionally targeted" when shot, plaintiff could not
show violation of constitutional rights).
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seized ten-year-old boy, instead of his intended target-the family dog .28
The court noted that, since federal courts may exercise discretion in deciding
"which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first," it was permissive to begin the specific fact analysis of this
situation to first determine if there was a clearly established right, instead of
starting the analysis with a determination of whether a constitutional
violation had even occurred. 29 The court decided that because SDC was held
at gunpoint while he laid face down on the ground, he had been "seized" for
Fourth Amendment purposes, which was consequently a requirement for a
qualified immunity analysis based upon SDC's status as an innocent
bystander to excessive force.3 °
In analyzing whether Corbitt could overcome the defense of
qualified immunity, the court noted that, because she did not present any
"materially similar case[s]" from a controlling jurisdiction, the only way she
could survive the motion to dismiss was to show either that "a broader,
clearly established principle should control the novel facts.., as a matter of
obvious clarity," or that the officer's conduct "so obviously violates [the]
constitution that prior case law is unnecessary."'" Lending deference to the
28 Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1310 (1
lth Cir. 2019) (reasoning that officer is shielded

where no clearly established right existed).
29 See id. at 1311 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)) (articulating
discretion in determining which prong of clearly established right test should be analyzed first). In
determining first whether a clearly established right existed, the court noted that "[tihe contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right." Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)).
30 See Corbitt,929 F.3d at 1313-15 (demonstrating innocent bystanders can still be considered
seized within meaning of Fourth Amendment). The court stated that, although the "commands of
the officers" were directed at SDC, Corbitt did not claim those actions violated SDC's Fourth
Amendment rights, rather that the action of firing at the dog and accidentally injuring the child
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 1315. In order to prove a violation of SDC's Fourth
Amendment rights, Corbitt must have alleged that a seizure occurred and that "the force used to
effect the seizure was unreasonable." Id. (quoting Troupe v. Sarasota County, 419 F.3d 1160, 1166
(11th Cir. 2005)); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-29 (1991) (holding that
seizure occurs when subject yields to show of authority by police); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (concluding seizure occurs when reasonable person does not feel free to
leave). Using precedent, the Eleventh Circuit found "there was without question an initial 'show
of authority' to which SDC clearly yielded," and, therefore, a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1313. The court further noted that this principle applies "with equal force in
cases involving innocent bystanders located at the scene of an active arrest." Id. at 1314.
31 See Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159
(11 th Cir. 2005)) (determining "it is very difficult to demonstrate" remaining ways to overcome
qualified immunity). The Corbitt court determined that the district court "erred in relying on the
general proposition that it is clearly established that the use of excessive force is unconstitutional."
Id. at 1316. The plaintiff failed to overcome the officer's defense of qualified immunity under the
second method for two reasons. Id. at 1316-19. First, since this case was not obvious, no principles
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purpose of qualified immunity, the court concluded that, because police
officers are "often forced to make split-second judgments," the plaintiff's
complaint did not allege a situation that "so clearly and obviously presented
such danger to SDC that every objectively reasonable officer confronted
with the situation Vickers encountered would have known ... that a shot at

the dog would violate the Fourth Amendment. '32 Given that the answer to
the relevant question of "whether every reasonable officer would have
inevitably refused to [shoot the dog] in light of the Fourth Amendment
standards" was in the negative, the court concluded that Vickers was entitled
to qualified immunity and instructed the district court to dismiss the action
against him. 33 In his dissent, Circuit Judge Wilson focused on the third
method in which a plaintiff can overcome the defense of qualified immunity,
determining that Vickers should not have been entitled to qualified immunity
because "no reasonable officer would engage in such recklessness and no
34
reasonable officer would think such recklessness was lawful.
Although the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals correctly
determined that the first and second methods to overcome a defense of
qualified immunity did not apply in this case, ultimately, the court's holding

from prior decisions provided insight into the "obvious clarity" necessary to place officers on notice
that this specific conduct could be a violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. I.
Second, the violative conduct was not directed specifically at SDC. Id.
32 See id. at 1321-22 (emphasizing possibility that reasonable officer would have fired at dog
under these circumstances). The majority noted that the Supreme Court has directed the lower
courts to assess the "'reasonableness at the moment' of the officer's actions not from the plaintiff's
perspective, but instead 'from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene"' without 20/20
hindsight. Id. at 1322 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). The court focused
on case precedent that indicated it had not been clearly established whether "the accidental effects
Id. at 1323.
of official actions targeting others gives rise to a Fourth Amendment violation ....
" See Corbitt,929 F.3d at 1323 (holding clearly established right not violated, therefore no
need to determine whether constitutional violation occurred).
34 See Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1325-26 (1lth Cir. 2019) (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(examining fact that Vickers faced "no apparent threat," but chose to shoot regardless). Judge
Wilson noted that the Supreme Court has determined that a reasonableness analysis under the
Fourth Amendment "'requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case,' including the severity of the crime at issue, the safety interests of officers and others, and any
risk of violence or flight by a suspect." Id. at 1324-25 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
396 (1989)). Crucial to this discussion was the fact that the pet was of a nonthreatening nature and,
thus, "discharging a lethal weapon at a nonthreatening pet surrounded by children" was "plainly
unreasonable." Id. at 1325 (Wilson, J., dissenting). The dissent also examined the consistent denial
of qualified immunity "when the defendant-officer exhibited excessive force in the face of no
apparent threat." Id. Finally, Judge Wilson reiterated the requirement at the motion to dismiss
stage to accept the plaintiffs allegations as true and, instead of unfairly and prematurely cutting off
the plaintiff's only avenue for redress against the officer's violation, the jury should have
considered the question of whether qualified immunity should protect the officer. Id.
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completely underexaggerated the facts and circumstances of the case. 5 The
court correctly found that Corbitt did not meet her burden to overcome the

officer's qualified immunity defense as there was neither a "materially
similar binding case," nor any "nonbinding case law" to establish a Fourth
Amendment violation.36 Rather, the third method to overcome the qualified
immunity defense should be based upon a reasonableness standard. 37 As
such, prior case law is unnecessary as it is impossible to say that every
reasonable officer would believe that the reckless and unreasonable decision
to shoot at a nonthreatening dog, only eighteen inches away from a child,
38
would be reasonable.
Further, the Eleventh Circuit relied far too heavily on Corbitt' s claim
that by "firing at the dog and accidentally hitting SDC," Officer Vickers
violated SDC's Fourth Amendment rights; the court did not focus on the

claim that Officer Vickers' seizure of SDC violated his Fourth Amendment
rights .3 As such, intentionality was the ultimate hook on which the court
hung its hat in concluding that qualified immunity did not apply .4 The court

35 See Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1315 (finding plaintiff could only overcome defense by third
method).
36 See id. (noting failure to present materially similar cases or violation was clearly established
under Fourth Amendment); see also Eskow & Cole, supra note 18, at 871 (noting circuit split
regarding qualified immunity defense where unreasonable force used and analyzing subjective
intent); Schweikert, supra note 22 (discussing "unsurprising" lack of prior case law based on
"shockingly reckless nature of Vickers's actions").
37 See Franks, supra note 26, at 502 (discussing reasonableness test where plaintiffs can allege
"seizure" by police under Fourth Amendment).
38 See Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1323 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (maintaining that "no competent
officer would fire his weapon in the direction of a nonthreatening pet" while surrounded by
children); see also Eskow & Cole, supra note 18, at 874 (explaining courts must determine whether
objectively reasonable official "could have believed his conduct did not violate clearly established
law"); Franks, supra note 26, at 502 (noting reasonableness test only triggered if subjects of police
force can allege "seizure" under Fourth Amendment). "[A]n official seeking qualified immunity
can guess wrong about the constitutionality of his conduct without incurring liability under section
1983, provided that the mistake is a reasonable one." Eskow & Cole, supra note 18, at 874. "Law
enforcement personnel," however, will not be shielded by qualified immunity if "their actions were
inherently wrongful." See Armacost, supra note 18, at 633. Further, "when the underlying
conduct.., contains indicia of its own blameworthiness" a court should deny qualified immunity
since "a precisely analogous case ... would create perverse incentives indeed if a qualified
immunity defense could succeed against those types of claims that have not previously arisen
because the behavior alleged is so egregious that no like case is on the books." See Armacost,
supra note 18, at 662 (internal citations omitted).
39 See Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1315 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting consequences of
plaintiff's failure to allege SDC's seizure violated his rights).
40 See id. (finding no Fourth Amendment violation as officer did not intend to shoot SDC); see
also Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470,479-83 (4th Cir. 2006) (granting qualified immunity to officer
because officer did not intend to shoot victim); Brown, supra note 17, at 204-05 (noting Eleventh
Circuit's error in application of qualified immunity defense). "The Supreme Court made clear ...
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should have found that the intention requirement of a Fourth Amendment
violation was satisfied given the district court's reasoning that this case
involved an "accidental shooting," rather than an "accidental firing," and
reasonable inferences could lead a jury to find that the officer "intended to
shoot the animal in order to maintain his control of the situation," was
correct. 4 1 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on dicta in case
precedent to find that accidental effects of government action never rise to
the level of misuse of power required to prove a Fourth Amendment
violation. 42 Thus, the court ignored that Vickers could still have misused his
power by recklessly shooting at a nonthreatening pet to maintain control of
an already contained situation.' 3

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that there was no clearly
established right to be free from accidental applications of force, and
44
therefore no need to determine whether a constitutional violation occurred.
In doing so, the court failed to solve the problem, not only for the case at bar,
but also for additional cases moving forward." As such, plaintiffs remain
Brown, supra note 17, at
that factual similarity is not the touchstone of qualified immunity ....
204-05. Rather, "fair warning" to officials that the conduct may be unconstitutional should be the
touchstone of qualified immunity. Brown, supra note 17, at 204-05; see also French, supra note
22 (discussing court's faulty reasoning because shot was not directed at the child). "The officer's
dangerously poor aim helped him evade liability" because there was no intentional action towards
the plaintiff. French, supra note 22.
41 See Corbitt v. Wooten, No. 5:16-CV-51, 2017 WL 6028640 at *6 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2017),
rev'd, 929 F.3d (2019) (denying qualified immunity because officer used excessive force in firing
his weapon); see also Nemeth, supra note 20, at 1008 (discussing "proper focus" should be whether,
understanding what officer knew at time, there was governmental interest in action).
42 See Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1317 (finding officer's lack of intent to shoot child created
accidental situation and not constitutional violation).
43 See id. (discussing why intent requirement had not been met); see also Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (holding that force employed by government official must be
directed towards plaintiff); cf. Corbitt, 2017 WL 6028640 at *6 (noting "touchstone for
reasonableness in animal shooting cases" is officer safety). Since "no allegations suggest Vickers
was unsafe in any way or that [the family dog] exhibited any signs of aggression," the officer had
no reasonable basis to discharge his firearm and was not entitled to qualified immunity. Corbitt,
2017 WL 6028640 at *6; see also Schweikert, supra note 22 (analyzing downfalls of dismissing
cases outright based on qualified immunity). The majority has ignored "the exact mechanism - a
public jury trial - that is supposed to ensure accountability for public officials." Schweikert, supra
note 22.
44 See Corbitt,929 F.3d at 1323 (discussing unnecessary to determine whether facts amount
to constitutional violation and limited holding of case).
45 See Blum, supra note 19, at 1897 (noting downfall of courts exercising discretion in leaving
clearly established question unanswered). "The exercise of... discretion in favor of not deciding
often leave important, recurring, and non-fact-bound constitutional questions needlessly
floundering in lower courts." Blum, supra note 19, at 1897; see also Schweikert, supra note 22
(discussing failure of court to set precedent for future similar acts). The majority took the
"cowardly option of declining even to decide the constitutional question, ensuring that the law will
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vulnerable to similarly unreasonable and reckless applications of force
because such actions cannot be considered "clearly established."46
Although qualified immunity certainly has a place in modem society
to ensure police officers are able to serve and protect the public without fear

that every application of force will end in a lawsuit, courts must draw a clear
line between accidental injuries that are a result of necessary and reasonable
police action and accidental injuries that occur as a result of reckless and
unreasonable police behavior. 47 Here, since there is no materially similar
case precedent and because Officer Vickers's conduct obviously violated
SDC's Fourth Amendment rights, the court should have taken the position
that qualified immunity for accidental shootings can only be available where

the officer did not engage in objectively reckless or unreasonable conduct
and could not have believed such conduct to be lawful. 48 By finding that

Officer Vickers's actions were objectively unreasonable, the court could
have not only created precedent for similar situations, but also start the

not be 'clearly established' going forward either." Schweikert, supranote 22. Essentially, "Vickers
could commit the exact same sort of misconduct tomorrow and receive qualified immunity yet
again." Schweikert, supra note 22.
46 See Sibilla, supra note 18 (criticizing Eleventh Circuit's decision and identifying potential
consequences). Even if an almost identical case appears in the future, "the court's refusal means
the right not to be accidentally shot by police still wouldn't have been 'clearly established' in the
eyes of the Eleventh Circuit." Sibilla, supra note 18.
47 See Eskow & Cole, supra note 18, at 888 (noting even where constitutional violation
occurs,
officer still should be able to assert qualified immunity). Qualified immunity should still protect
an officer as "there may be circumstances under which an officer mistakenly, but reasonably, could
have believed the use of force was reasonable." Eskow & Cole, supra note 18, at 888; see also
Armacost, supra note 18, at 584 (analyzing primary purpose of qualified immunity is "to ensure
that government officials can anticipate when their actions are likely to subject them to liability.");
Bernick, supra note 26 (discussing historical and pragmatic justifications for qualified immunity
for police officers to conduct their jobs); cf. Miller, supra note 26 (identifying defense unavailable
for SWAT officer who pointed gun at non-threatening man lying on ground). Since the officer was
on notice that his actions toward an "innocent and compliant person" were unreasonable, qualified
immunity did not shield the officer from liability. Miller, supra note 26.
48 See Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1323 (1lth Cir. 2019) (Wilson, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with majority on who is protected). Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly
incompetent," but because no "competent officer would fire his weapon in the direction of a
nonthreatening pet... qualified immunity should not protect" the officer. Id.; see also Nemeth,
supra note 20, at 1021 (highlighting that lower courts should be able "to clearly establish laws and
recognize constitutional violations irrespective of equivalent cases on point."); Bernick, supra note
26 (analyzing possibility for courts to "retreat from its more sweeping statements concerning
qualified immunity"); Schweikert, supra note 22 (discussing need to "rethink qualified immunity"
to comply with text and history of § 1983). Courts could, for example, disavow "the proposition
that officials must be plainly incompetent or knowingly violate the law before they are denied
qualified immunity ... or recognize ... the relevance of subjective intent of officials." Schweikert,
supra note 22; see also Leef, supra note 17 (discussing necessity to return to original meaning of §
1983, and hold officials strictly liable for misconduct).
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distinction process between reasonable actions that lead to accidental injuries
and reckless actions that cause unintended harm.4 9
In Corbitt v. Vickers, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
determined whether a police officer was entitled to the defense of qualified
immunity when he intentionally shot at a nonthreatening family dog, but
accidentally hit a ten-year-old child. The court prematurely cut off the
plaintiff's right to seek redress for the officer's unreasonable and reckless
conduct by determining that there was no constitutional violation as the
officer's decision to fire his gun at the dog was not directed at the child. By
refusing to determine whether freedom from accidental and unreasonable
uses of excessive force was a clearly established right, the court failed to set
any relevant precedent for future plaintiffs who seek to file suit against
officers who accidentally, yet unreasonably, injure or kill innocent
bystanders. Although there is a place for the defense of qualified immunity
in modem society to protect police officers from lawsuits based on
reasonable and warranted conduct, courts must find a balance by weighing
the purpose of the defense with the right of an innocent bystander to seek
damages when unreasonable police conduct so clearly violates their Fourth
Amendment rights.
Hannah A. Jacobs

49 See Sibilla, supranote 18 (discussing consequences of failing to make this distinction); see

also Leef, supra note 17 (noting demand to hold officials strictly liable under § 1983); Schweikert,
supra note 22 (explaining necessity in amending qualified immunity analysis).

